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1  Introduction 
 
Same-sex marriage became a reality in South Africa when the Civil Union Act
1 was 
enacted  on  30  November  2006.    This  Act  makes  provision  for  same-sex  and 
opposite-sex  couples  to  formalise  their  relationships  by  entering  into  either  a 
marriage or a civil partnership,
2 both of which enjoy the same legal recognition as, 
and give rise to the same legal consequences of, a civil marriage under the Marriage 
Act.
3  The latter Act remains however a vehicle by which only heterosexual couples 
may enter into the institution of matrimony; a state of affairs that has elicited severe 
criticism from a number of commentators.
4  This point of criticism, coupled with the 
potential  enactment  of  domestic  partnership  legislation  (in  the  form  of  a  Draft 
Domestic Partnerships Bill that appeared in early 2008)
5 casts significant doubt on 
the viability of the Civil Union Act in general and the dualistic nature of the civil union 
(as either a marriage or civil partnership) in particular.   Consequently, this paper 
aims, against the backdrop of the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill to evaluate the 
desirability of the continued existence of the Civil Union Act by comparing the South 
African Law Reform Commission's 2006 recommendation
6 to the effect that separate 
legislation was required in order to allow for same-sex marriages on the one hand, 
with the legislature's response to the Constitutional Court 's judgment in  Minister of 
                                                 
*   Bradley Shaun Smith.  BCom (UOFS) LLB (UOFS) LLM (UFS) LLD (UFS).  Senior lecturer in 
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1   17 of 2006 
2   S 1 definition of "civil union". 
3   25 of 1961 – see S 13 Civil Union Act. 
4   See for example De Vos and Barnard 2007 SALJ 821–822; Bilchitz and Judge 2007 SAJHR 
487–490. 
5   GN 36 in GG 30663 of 14 January 2008. 
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Home Affairs v Fourie (Doctors for Life International as Amici Curiae); Lesbian and 
Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs
7 on the other.  As an example of an 
established and well-ordered family law system, the legal position in the Netherlands 
will be compared to that in South Africa with a view to ascertaining which approach is 
more acceptable.  In this regard, a number of fundamental differences between the 
legal systems of the two countries will be highlighted, and a proposal will be made 
that  is  hoped  will  provide  a  less  complicated  and  more  streamlined  family  law 
dispensation  in  South  Africa.  As  a  point  of  departure,  it  is  necessary  briefly  to 
examine the content of the proposed domestic partnership legislation. 
 
2  Salient features of the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill 
 
In January 2008, the South African legislature unveiled its first concrete attempt to 
regulate  the  position  of  life  partnerships  in  South  Africa  in  the  form  of  a  Draft 
Domestic  Partnerships  Bill.
8  This  Draft  Bill provides for two forms o f domestic 
partnership:  registered  and  unregistered.    Entering  into  a  registered  domestic 
partnership involves a public commitment in the form of a formal registration process 
that is undertaken by two persons (irrespective of their gender),
9 neither of whom is 
married  or  in  a  civil  union  or  another  registered  domestic  partnership  with  an 
outsider.
10  In  consequence of registration, many of the legal consequences that 
attach to a valid marriage are extended to the  partners.  For instance, registered 
domestic partners will be placed under an  ex  lege  duty  to  support  one  another 
according to their respective means and needs,
11 will be prohibited from disposing of 
joint property without  written consent,
12  and will be entitled to occupy the family 
home irrespective of which partner owns or rents it.
13  A registered domestic partner 
will  also  automatically  qualify  as  a  "spouse"  for  the  purposes  of  the  Intestate 
Succession  Act
14  and  the  Maintenance  of  Surviving  Spouses  Act,
15  and  as  a 
                                                 
7   2006 1 SA 524 (CC); hereafter Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie. 
8   See n 4. 
9   Cf the preamble to the Draft Bill, which refers only to "opposite-sex couples" and therefore should 
be amended – see Smith Domestic Partnership Rubric 465-467.  
10   Clause 4(1) and (2) read with Clause 6. 
11   Clause 9. 
12   Clause 10. 
13   Clause 11(1). 
14   81 of 1987. 
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"dependant" in terms of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
Act.
16  Over and above termination through death, a registered domestic partnership 
can be terminated by mutual agreement coupled with a de-registration procedure,
17 
unless minor children are involved, in which case a court procedure similar to divorce 
is required.
18 
 
On the other hand, the unregistered domestic p artnership envisions a  (generally 
monogamous)
19 relationship that has not been registered under the  Draft Bill, and 
permits either or both partners to approach the High Court at the termination of the 
relationship for an  order relating  to  property  division,   maintenance,  or intestate 
succession.
20  In deciding whether to grant the order, the court must have regard to 
"all the circumstances of the relationship"
21 in addition to any specific requirements 
prescribed for the nature of the particular claim sought.
22  As such, the unregistered 
domestic partnership adopts an ex post facto judicial discretion model.
23  
 
From the outset, it must be noted that the Draft Bill is not flawless, and that a recent 
study
24  has  proposed  a  number  of  amendments  in  order  for  the  prosp ective 
legislation to function effectively and to be aligned  with complementary legislation 
such as the Children's Act.
25  For this reason, references throughout this paper to the 
                                                 
16   130 of 1993. 
17   Clauses 13 and 14. 
18   Clauses 15 and 16. 
19   In accordance with Clause 26(4) "[a] court may not make an order under this Act regarding a 
relationship  of  a  person  who,  at  the  time  of  that  relationship,  was  also  a  spouse  in  a  civil 
marriage or a partner in a civil union or a registered domestic partnership with a third party".  It 
appears therefore that this provision will not preclude an application brought by a person whose 
partner was: (i) married to a third party in terms of customary law or in terms of a system of 
religious law that sanctions polygyny (such as Islam or Hinduism); or (ii) who was involved in 
multiple unregistered domestic partnerships – see Smith (n 9) 508.   
20   Clause 26(1). 
21   Clause 26(2).  See Smith (n 9) 654-668 for a critique on this approach. 
22   For example, in assessing whether a partner is entitled to claim for the redistribution of separate 
property, a court must be satisfied that such an order will be "just and equitable" by virtue of the 
"direct or indirect contributions" made by the claimant to the "maintenance or increase of the 
separate property or part of the separate property of the other unregistered domestic partner" 
while the partnership subsisted – Clause 32(5).  
23   Contrary to the "de facto" or "ascription" model in terms of which status is automatically awarded 
to a relationship that satisfies certain criteria (such as a minimum period of duration) during its 
existence,  the  ex  post  facto  model  allows  a  court  application  to  be  brought  only  once  the 
relationship has ended, at which point the status of the relationship is considered – see SALRC 
(n 6) 366–369. 
24   See in general Smith (n 9) 461-746. 
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"(modified) Domestic Partnerships Bill" must be interpreted as referring to the Draft 
Bill as potentially amended in accordance with the proposals made in the study in 
question.  The need for modification notwithstanding, it can be accepted that the 
Draft Bill provides a more than reasonable indication of the legislature's view of the 
format that prospective domestic partnership legislation should assume,
26 and for 
this reason this paper will take the Draft Bill as its point of departure.  Moreover, the 
dire need for such legislation is patent in view of the "patchwork"
27 nature of the laws 
that currently govern non-formalised domestic partnerships in South Africa,
28 with the 
result that it can be accepted that it is only a question of time before such legislation 
will be promulgated.  Bearing these introductory comments in mind, the hi story 
behind the Civil Union Act can now be considered. 
 
3  The enactment of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006  and its aftermath 
 
In order fully to understand the submissions made in this article, the impact of the 
enactment  of  the  Civil  Union  Act  and  its  broadening  effect  on  marriage  and 
analogous interpersonal relationships that are recognised in South Africa must be 
considered.  This will be preceded by a brief comparison between the South African 
Law  Reform  Commission’s  proposals  regarding  same-sex  marriage  and  the 
legislature’s response to case law that provided the impetus for the enactment of the 
Act. 
 
3.1 The South African Law Reform Commission 
 
The  Constitutional  Court's  judgment  in  Minister  of  Home  Affairs  v  Fourie
29  gave 
Parliament one year as from 1 December 2005 within which to enact legislation that 
provided for same-sex marriages, failing which the Marriage Act would automatically 
be read in such a way as to permit same-sex couples to marry in terms of that Act.  
The issue that however needs to be considered is whether the option exercised by 
the legislature in response to Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie was the correct one, 
                                                 
26   Smith (n 9) 462-464. 
27   Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie para 125. 
28   See  the  discussion  in  S  3.3.6  below  with  reference  to  the  patchwork  of  laws  that  currently 
governs domestic partnerships. 
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and  to  this  end  a  convenient  point  of  departure  is  to  consider  the  SALRC's 
recommendations in this regard.  
 
The first steps towards assessing the post-1994 suitability of the South African law of 
marriage  were  taken  in  1996  when  the  Minister  of  Home  Affairs  requested  the 
SALRC investigate this matter.
30  In the light of case law such as the 1998 decision 
in Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security,
31 the SALRC's investigation was 
subsequently expanded to include the issue of "domestic partnerships".
32  As a result 
of this development, two separate projects were launched, the first dealing with the 
technical aspects of the law of marriage (Project 109) and the second dealing with 
domestic partners as such (Project 118).  Project 109 was completed in 2001
33 and 
in March 2006 the SALRC presented a report dealing with the second project.
34 
 
As can be deduced from this brief summary, the report produced in consequence of 
Project 118 saw the light of day only after the judgment in Minister of Home Affairs v 
Fourie had been delivered.  A memorandum that summarised the SALRC's findings 
up until that point was however provided to the Constitutional Court at that court's 
request,  and  it  is important to  note from  the  outset  that  in  his majority  judgment 
Sachs J made it abundantly clear that one of the reasons for suspending his order 
was  precisely  to  afford  the  legislature  sufficient  opportunity  to  take  proper 
cognisance of the SALRC's comprehensive research.
35  In as far as they pertain to 
same-sex marriage, the  recommendations made by the  SALRC in the 2006  report 
can be summarised as follows: 
(i)  The Marriage Act ought to be amended by: 
 -  the  insertion  of  definitions  of  the  concepts  "spouse"  and 
"marriage";  the  latter  of  which  should  clearly  provide  for  both 
heterosexual and homosexual marriages;
36 and 
-  the inclusion of the words "or spouse" after the word "husband" in 
section  30(1)  of  the  Act   so  as  to  provide  a  gender -neutral 
marriage formula;  
 
and 
                                                 
30   SALRC (n 6) 1. 
31   1998 3 SA 312 (T); hereafter Langemaat. 
32   SALRC (n 6) 1–2. 
33   SALRC 2001 http://www.justice.gov.za/. 
34   SALRC (n 6). 
35   Para 156. 
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(ii)  The Commission was of the opinion, for considerations of policy, that it 
was necessary  "to accommodate the religious and moral objections" 
that had been raised before the Commission against permitting same-
sex  marriage.    In  the  result,  the  Commission  opined  that  (over  and 
above the amendments to the Marriage Act described above) a new 
Act should be promulgated that allowed only for the solemnisation of 
"orthodox  marriages"  involving  one  man  and  one  woman.    This  Act 
would  furthermore  provide  only  for  the  solemnisation  of  religious 
marriages  and  only  ministers  of  religion  or  other  persons  holding 
responsible positions in religious denominations or organisations would 
consequently  be  permitted  to  qualify  as  marriage  officers  for  the 
purpose of that Act.
37 
 
As will be seen in the paragraphs that follow, the current position in South African 
family law does not reflect the SALRC's recommendations in any way. 
 
3.2  The legislature's response to Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie: The 
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 
 
The Civil Union Act defines a "civil union" as: 
 
the voluntary union of two persons who are both 18 years of age or older, 
which is solemnised and registered by way of either a marriage or a civil 
partnership, in accordance with the procedures prescribed in this Act, to the 
exclusion, while it lasts, of all others.
38 
 
The concept "civil union partner" is defined as "a spouse in a marriage or a partner in 
a civil partnership, as the case may be, concluded in terms of this Act".
39 
 
The definitions quoted lead to the conclusion that the term  "civil union" is merely 
semantic and that it has been employed merely to differentiate between marriage 
and civil partnership.
40  In addition, it is important to note t hat South African law 
permits marriages between persons of the same sex that are in all respects the 
equivalent of heterosexual marriages under the  Marriage Act.  This is facilitated by 
Section 13 of the Civil Union Act, which states: 
                                                 
37   SALRC (n 6) 311–313 (para 5.6.23–5.6.24). 
38   Emphasis added. 
39   Emphasis added. 
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(1)  The legal consequences of a marriage contemplated in the Marriage 
Act apply, with such changes as may be required by the context, to a 
civil union. 
(2)   With the exception of the Marriage Act and the Customary Marriages 
Act, any reference to- 
(a)  marriage in any other law, including the common law, includes, 
with  such  changes  as  may  be  required  by  the  context,  a  civil 
union; and 
(b)  husband, wife or spouse in any other law, including the common 
law, includes a civil union partner.
41 
 
This brief summary shows that instead of expanding the Marriage Act in the manner 
suggested by the SALRC, the legislature instead opted to introduce a "separate but 
equal"
42 regime to cater for same-sex marriage. 
 
3.3  Summary of marriage and analogous interpersonal relationships 
currently recognised in South African law 
 
For  the  sake  of  completeness,  it  is  useful  briefly  to  summarise  the  various 
interpersonal  relationships  that  currently  enjoy  some  form  of  legal  recognition  in 
South Africa.  These are discussed below. 
 
3.3.1  Civil marriages 
 
Civil  marriages  are  concluded  in  terms  of  the  common  law  as  amended  by  the 
Marriage  Act.    Only  monogamous  heterosexual marriages  may  be  solemnised  in 
terms of this Act.  As a general rule both prospective spouses must have reached 
the age of majority (18 years) in order to marry in terms of this Act, but the Act 
makes provision for minors to be permitted to marry under certain circumstances.
43 
 
3.3.2  Marriages under the Civil Union Act 
 
This Act caters for a specific form of marriage as a creature of statute.  It provides for 
both  opposite  and  same-sex  couples  to  marry  one  another.    Both  prospective 
                                                 
41   Emphasis added. 
42   De Vos and Barnard (n 4) 821.  
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spouses must be at least 18 years of age and, in contrast with the Marriage Act, no 
provision is made for persons younger than 18 to marry one another. 
 
3.3.3  Customary marriages 
 
The  Recognition  of  Customary  Marriages  Act
44  makes  provision  for  the  legal 
recognition of both monogamous and polygynous customary marriages.  This Act 
applies  only  to  marriages  concluded  according  to  "the  customs  and  usages 
traditionally  observed  among  the  indigenous  African  peoples  of  South  Africa  and 
which form part of the culture of those peoples".
45  A customary marriage concluded 
in accordance with this Act is currently the only means by which a polygynous 
marriage can be clothed with complete legal validity in South African law.
46 
 
3.3.4  Civil partnerships 
 
Over and above marriage, the Civil Union Act also provides for persons involved in a 
monogamous relationship to enter into a civil partnership with one another.
47  This 
concept is unfortunately not defined by the Act and doubt persists as to the precise 
legal nature thereof.  It is submitted that the l egislature has attempted to create a 
mechanism by which two persons can formalise their relationship in instances  in 
which they do not wish to marry one another but nevertheless wish to ensure that 
their relationship obtains legal recognition.
48  According to De Vos,
49 an example of 
such a relationship may occur within the context of  "more conservative same-sex 
couples who view marriage as an institution exclusively associated with heterosexual 
relationships".  This would appear to tie in with Bilchitz and Judge's
50 opinion that the 
civil  partnership  provides  an  alternative  to  those  who  view  marriage  as  an 
"oppressive institution marked by rigid gender roles and expectations" by providing 
                                                 
44   120 of 1998. 
45   Definition of "customary marriage" read with definition of "customary law" in S 1 of the Act. 
46   Sonnekus 2009 THRHR 138. 
47   See S 1 and 3.2 ante. 
48   It is important to note that until domestic partnership legislation is enacted the civil partnership 
will be the only means by which such recognition can be obtained outside of marriage – see S 
3.3.6 below. 
49   2007 SAJHR 462. 
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couples with a means of determining the social meaning of their relationship.  This 
aspect will be considered in more detail later.  
 
3.3.5  Purely religious marriages 
 
Marriages that are entered into in accordance with the tenets of a specific religion 
without being solemnised or registered according to applicable marriage legislation 
(so-called  "purely  religious  marriages")  are  not  recognised  as  valid  marriages  by 
South African law.
51  The courts and the legislature have however been prepared to 
grant  piecemeal  extensions  of  the  law  of  marriage  to  such  relationships.
52  
Legislation validating such marriages is therefore sorely needed, but attempts in this 
regard have thus far been restricted  to marriages concluded in r espect of Islamic 
religious law.
53     
 
3.3.6  Domestic or life partnerships 
 
Domestic or life partners are persons who: (a) are not spouses in a purely religious 
marriage; and (b) are involved in permanent (intimate)
54 relationships that have not 
been  formalised  in  terms  of  the  Marriage  Act,  the  Recognition  of  Customary 
Marriages Act or the Civil Union Act.
55 
 
The current legal position pertaining to life or domestic partnerships in South Africa is 
fraught  with  inconsistencies.    To  begin  with,  there  is  no  "law  of  domestic 
partnerships"
56 so that, generally speaking, none of the invariable consequences that 
                                                 
51   Within the context of Hindu marriages, see Singh v Ramparsad 2007 3 SA 445 (D) para 30–34, 
para 47 and 52; hereafter Singh.  As far as Islamic marriages are concerned see Ismail v Ismail 
2007 4 SA 557 (E) para 7. 
52   In respect of Islamic marriages see  Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (C); Amod v Multilateral 
Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 
(SCA); Daniels v Campbell 2004 5 SA 331 (CC); Khan v Khan 2005 2 SA 272 (T); and Hassam v 
Jacobs  2009  5  SA  572  (CC).    As  far  as  Hindu  marriages  are  concerned,  see  Govender  v 
Ragavayah 2009 3 SA 178 (D).  An example of legislative recognition is provided by S 1 of the 
Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998, which includes a marriage "according to any law, custom or 
religion" as a "domestic relationship". 
53   See Smith (n 9) 134-140. 
54   Intimacy  does  not  appear  to  be  a  requirement  for  recognition  –  see  Bezuidenhout  v  ABSA 
Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 40688/2008. 
55   Smith (n 9) 182-183. 
56   Hahlo 1972 SALJ 321.  BS SMITH AND JA ROBINSON                         PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
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attach  to  marriage  attach  to  non-formalised  domestic  partnerships
57  and  such 
couples only have the "ordinary rules and remedies of the law" (such as the law of 
contract,  estoppel  and  unjustified  enrichment)  at  their  disposal.
58  This  general 
position has been developed on an ad hoc basis by the legislature and the courts, so 
that domestic partnerships receive recognition under certain circumstances.  As far 
as  the  judicial  developments  are  concerned,  this  recognition  has  been  limited  to 
same-sex  life  partners,  as,  at  the  time  of  the  applications  for  extension  being 
brought, same-sex marriage was not yet legally permissible, with the result that a 
domestic partnership was "the only form of conjugal relationship open to gays and 
lesbians in harmony with their sexual orientation".
59  The courts were consequently 
readily  prepared  to  find  that  the  exclusion  of  such  couples  from  the  benefits 
heretofore limited to married couples constituted unfair discrimination.  As a corollary 
hereof, the  courts were not prepared to extend the invariable consequences of 
marriage to heterosexual life partners who, despite being legally permitted to do so, 
had nevertheless elected not to marry one another.
60  As the Constitutional Court 
has  made  it  clear  that  the  pre -Civil  Union  Act  declarations  of  statutory 
unconstitutionality will continue to stand until expressly amended by the legislature,
61 
the  current  legal  position  dictates  that  same -sex  domestic  partnerships  enjoy 
significantly  greater  legal  recognition  and  protection  than  their  heterosexual 
counterparts.
62  As far as legislation is concerned, certain Acts (such as the Medical 
Schemes  Act
63  and  the  Pension  Funds  Act)
64  provide  recognition  to  domestic 
partnerships for the purposes of those specific Acts.  Advising domestic partners on 
                                                 
57   Heaton 2005 THRHR 662. 
58   SALRC (n 6) 110–111. 
59   National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC) 
para 36; hereafter National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality.  For examples of case law 
involving same-sex domestic partners, see Langemaat; Satchwell v President of the Republic of 
South Africa 2002 6 SA 1 (CC) and 2003 4 SA 266 (CC); Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and 
Population Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC); J v Director-General: Department of Home Affairs 
2003 5 SA 621 (CC) – hereafter J-case;  Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA) 
– hereafter Du Plessis; and Gory v Kolver 2007 4 SA 97 (CC); hereafter Gory. 
60   Volks v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) para 55–60 (hereafter Volks), read with Sachs J's 
dissenting judgment at para 154.   
61   Gory para 28–30. 
62   De Vos and Barnard (n 4) 462; Smith and Robinson (n 39) 439. 
63   131 of 1998.  In this Act, a "dependant" includes a "spouse or partner" (see S 1). 
64   25 of 1956.  A "spouse" for the purposes of this Act includes "a permanent life partner or spouse 
or civil union partner in accordance with the Marriage Act, 1961 (Act 68 of 1961), the Recognition 
of Customary Marriages Act, 1998 (Act 68 of 1997), or the Civil Union Act, 2006 (Act 17 of 2006), 
or the tenets of a religion […]" – see S 1 (emphasis added).    BS SMITH AND JA ROBINSON                         PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
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their rights and obligations therefore becomes, as Sinclair
65 rightly points out  "an 
exercise in tracking what legislation or rule of common law [has]  been successfully 
attacked and what [has] not". 
 
The recognition of same-sex marriage further complicates this scenario, as the same 
rationale employed to refuse the extension of marriage benefits to heterosexual 
domestic partners in the past now  strictu sensu also applies to same-sex partners 
who have not entered into a civil union despite being legally permitted to do so.
66 
 
In the end result, it is clear that until domestic partnership legislation is enacted the 
legal position pertaining to  domestic partnerships  will continue to be fragmented, 
inconsistent, and fraught with uncertainty. 
 
3.3.7  Conclusion 
 
The  preceding  discussion  illustrates  the  complex  manner  in  which  marriage,  civil 
partnership and unmarried life partnerships are currently regulated in South African 
law.  The question that now arises is whether this state of affairs should persist, and, 
if not, what remedial action should be proposed.  Before making suggestions in this 
regard, it is useful to consider the example provided by a well-structured family law 
system such as the one encountered in the Netherlands. 
 
4  The legal position in the Netherlands 
 
Smith  and  Robinson
67  opine  that the family law framework in the Netherlands is 
clearly demarcated and is the product of  "well-conceived and carefully considered 
Parliamentary procedures".  As such, it is submitted that it provides an effective 
sounding board for evaluating whether the separate Act approach towards same-sex 
marriage occasioned by the enactment of the Civil Union Act was the correct one. 
 
                                                 
65   Sinclair "South Africa" 398.  Although Sinclair makes this comment in reference to same-sex 
domestic partnerships, it is clear that the same principle also applies to the piecemeal statutory 
recognition accorded to heterosexual partnerships. 
66   Sinclair (n 64) 406–408.  
67   2008 IJLPF 376–377.   BS SMITH AND JA ROBINSON                         PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
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Over  the  past  decade  or  so  Dutch  family  law  has  undergone  a  number  of 
progressive  and  trend-setting  developments  that  have  galvanised  jurisdictions 
across the globe.  Unlike the position in South Africa, these developments have been 
occasioned  by  way  of  legislative  processes  as  opposed  to  judicial 
pronouncements.
68  According to Maxwell,
69 the role played by the Dutch judiciary 
can be summarised  as follows:    In 1990,  two Dutch courts (a District Court in 
Amsterdam
70 and the Dutch Supreme Court)
71 were requested to adjudicate on the 
possible recognition of same -sex marriages.  Two arguments were raised in this 
regard:  First, it was contended that, as  Article 30 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek did not 
make any direct reference to gender (it simply stated that "De wet beschouwt het 
huwelijk  alleen  in  zijn  burgerlijke  betrekkingen"),  it  could  be  interpreted  so  as  to 
provide  for  same-sex  marriages.    Both  courts  however  held  that  Article  30  was 
enacted with a view to heterosexual marriages only and was thus not capable of 
being interpreted in this fashion.  Second, it  was suggested that the limitation to 
heterosexual marriage infringed certain individual rights and discriminated against 
same-sex couples.  This argument also failed as the Amsterdam court held that it 
was the task of the legislature to rectify differential treatment.  The Supreme Court in 
turn relied on the "traditional" definition of marriage in order to justify its refusal to 
grant the relief sought by the applicants.  The latter court did however concede that 
while the limitation of matrimonial benefits to heterosexual couples could in principle 
be unjustifiable, it should be left to the legislature to decide this issue.  In contrast to 
the  courts,  the  Dutch  legislature  has  played  a  far  more  active  role  in  reforming 
matrimonial  law:  Dutch  legislation  has  not  only  provided  for  the  formalisation  of 
cohabitation  relationships  since  1998,
72  but  in  April  2001  the  Netherlands  also 
became the first country in the world to accord full legal recognition to same -sex 
marriages.
73  Dutch law currently provides couples wishing to formalise their unions 
with three methods of doing so.
74  These are discussed below. 
 
                                                 
68   See S 5.1.1 below. 
69   2000 EJCL S 2.2.1. 
70   Rb Amsterdam 13 februari 1990, Boele-Woelki and Tange 1990 NJCM Bulletin 456–560, per 
Maxwell (n 69) S 2.2.1 and Merin Equality for Same-Sex Couples 123. 
71   HR 19 oktober 1990, per Maxwell (n 69) S 2.1.1.  
72   See S 4.2 below. 
73   Waaldijk 2004 NELR 572. 
74   See Smith and Robinson (n 66) 374–376 for a more detailed discussion.  BS SMITH AND JA ROBINSON                         PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
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4.1  Civil marriage 
 
As far back as April 1996, the Dutch Parliament passed a resolution in terms of 
which the extension of civil marriage to same-sex couples was demanded.
75  The 
Burgerlijk  Wetboek  was  amended  five  years  later  so  as  to  provide  full  legal 
recognition to gay and lesbian marriages.
76   
 
Previously the major difference between heterosexual and homosexual marriages in 
Dutch law was encountered in the law of adoption that only permitted heterosexual 
spouses to participate in inter-country adoptions.  As of 1 February 2009 , the Wet 
Opneming Buitenlandse Kinderen ter Adoptie
77 was amended to permit same-sex 
spouses to adopt children from abroad.
78  A same-sex marriage has no effect on the 
legal relationship between a same-sex spouse and the biological child of his or her 
spouse,
79 unless the former person adopts the child.
80  (In this regard, it is worth 
mentioning that the adoption procedures pertaining to female same -sex couples 
were simplified as from 1 February 2009.)
81  Both spouses  in a lesbian marriage 
automatically acquire parental responsibility over a child born to one of them during 
the currency of their marriage "tenzij het kind tevens in familierechtelijke betrekking 
staat tot een andere ouder ".
82  If the child was conceived as a result of sperm 
donated by the father, the latter may, with the mother's consent, recognise the child, 
in which case he and the mot her will be regarded as the legal parents of the child 
while the mother and her spouse will share parental responsibility.
83 
 
Irrespective  of  the  gender  of  the  spouses,  Dutch  law  only  recognises  civil 
marriages
84  with the result that marriages solemnised onl y by way of a religious 
                                                 
75   Maxwell (n 69) S 2.2.1. 
76   This was achieved by amending Article 1:30 of the Wetboek to read: "1. Een huwelijk kan worden 
aangegaan door twee personen van verschillend of van gelijk geslacht". 
77   Act of 24 October 2008. 
78   Curry-Sumner and Vonk "It All Depends on Who You Ask" 330–331. 
79   Waaldijk (n 72) 575; Vonk 2009 ULR 125. 
80   Netherlands Ministry of Justice 2006 http://english.justitie.nl/. 
81   Curry-Sumner and Vonk (n 77) 330–331. 
82   Article 1:253sa. 
83   Curry-Sumner and Vonk (n 77) 335. 
84   Article  1:30(2)  of  the  Wetboek:  "De  wet  beschouwt  het  huwelijk  alleen  in  zijn  burgerlijke 
betrekkingen".  Also see Waaldijk (n 72) 572.    BS SMITH AND JA ROBINSON                         PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
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ceremony are not legally valid.
85  The secular and religious components of marriage 
are therefore completely divorced from one another and marriages may only receive 
an ecclesiastical blessing after the completion of the civil ceremony.
86 
 
4.2  Registered partnership 
 
As  from  1  January  1998,  parties  of  the  same  or  opposite  sex  may  enter  into  a 
geregistreerd partnerschap with one another.  Both parties must be at least 18 years 
of  age  and  the  partnership  comes  into  existence  as  soon  as  the  partners  have 
signed and registered a so-called akte van registratie van partnerschap.
87  All of the 
consequences of a civil marriage apply to a registered partnership,
88  but certain 
differences occur with respect to children in that registered partners may not partake 
in inter-country adoptions, and where a child is born to a female partner in a lesbian 
relationship, her female partner is not regarded as the parent of that child unless she 
adopts  the  child.
89  In  the  case  of  a  child  born  as  a  consequence  o f  sexual 
intercourse  to  a  female  partner  who  is  involved  in  a  heterosexual  registered 
partnership, the male partner is not presumed to be the father of the child, with the 
result that he can acknowledge the child if his partner consents hereto.
90  If the child 
was conceived artificially by making use of the male partner 's sperm, the latter is 
regarded as a sperm donor with the result that he has no rights to the child unless 
his partner consents thereto or unless a  "family life" exists between himself and the 
child.
91  If a child is born to lesbian or heterosexual partners , both partners acquire 
parental responsibility over such a child unless the biological father has  – with the 
mother's consent – acknowledged paternity before the child's birth.
92   
 
A registered partnership can be terminated in the following ways: ( a) by death of 
either or both partners; (b) where one partner has been missing for more than five 
                                                 
85   SALRC (n 6) 167; Waaldijk (n 72) 572–573. 
86   Netherlands Ministry of Justice (n 79). 
87   Article 1: 80a. 
88   Article 1: 80a. 
89   SALRC (n 6) 174; Vonk (n 78) 125. 
90   Vonk (n 78) 122; Waaldijk 2005 https://same-sex.web.ined.fr/ 140. 
91   Curry-Sumner and Vonk (n 77) 340, referring to a decision of the Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) of 
24 January 2003 (NJ 2003/386).  
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years; (c) by converting the partnership into a marriage; (d) by mutual agreement; 
and (e) by an order of court.
93 
 
4.3  Contract 
 
Cohabitants may regulate the patrimonial consequences of their relationship by way 
of a contractual undertaking to this effect.  The usual principles of the Dutch law of 
contract apply to such an agreement with the result that  it binds only the parties 
thereto and does so only to the extent of the provisions therein.
94  As in South Africa, 
Dutch  law  provides  only  piecemeal  recognition  to  non -formalised  domestic 
partnerships.
95  It would however appear that this piecemeal recogniti on provides 
more comprehensive protection as far as the patrimonial consequences of such a 
union are concerned than in South Africa, as that the existence of a tacit cohabitation 
agreement is readily inferred implies that it is sometimes possible to  "borrow" from 
certain patrimonial consequences of marriage, unless the parties have specifically 
elected not to marry.
96  So, for example, while general community of property applies 
in the case of a civil marriage,
97 Van der Burght
98 mentions that the facts of the case 
may permit a  "limited community" to be found to exist between the parties to non -
formalised unions.
99  Nevertheless, an important parallel that can be drawn between 
the position of cohabitants in the Netherlands and their South African counterparts is 
that  no  specific  legislation  as  yet  caters  for  such  unions.
100  Consequently, 
Schrama
101  mentions that while approximately one half of all cohabitants in the 
Netherlands opt for entering into a cohabitation contract, this does little to solve the 
problems faced by the parties thereto when the relationship breaks down, as the 
"general rules of contract law and property law " that apply to such cohabitants are 
not only "primarily designed to regulate economically based relations ", but are also 
not applied  in a consistent fashion by the c ourts, leading to legal uncertainty and 
                                                 
93   Article 1:80c. 
94   Waaldijk (n 90) 139. 
95   See Van der Burght 2000 De Jure 78–80; SALRC (n 6) 167. 
96   Van der Burght (n 95) 78. 
97   Netherlands Ministry of Justice (n 79). 
98   (n 95) 78. 
99   In South Africa, the partners would have to rely on a universal partnership, provided of course 
that they can prove the existence thereof – see SALRC (n 6) 111–117. 
100  Schrama 2008 IJLPF 321. 
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"injustice  towards  partners  who  have  substantially  invested  in  the  relationship  by 
taking care of children or contributing to the other partner's assets." 
 
5  Evaluation of the current position in South Africa 
 
In the section that follows, the current position in South Africa will be evaluated by 
considering  a  number  of  similarities  and  differences  between  South  African  and 
Dutch law, as well as the cases for and against repealing the Civil Union Act.   
 
5.1  Important  similarities  and  differences  between  South  African  and 
Dutch law 
 
The  cursory  analysis  conducted  above  shows  that  the  family  law  system  in  the 
Netherlands provides its citizens with a well-structured and relatively straightforward 
framework within which to regulate their interpersonal relationships.  In contrast with 
the  position  in  South  Africa,  all  drastic  changes  and  developments  have  been 
occasioned  by  the  legislature  in  consequence  of  judicial  pronouncements  to  the 
effect that this arm of government was best suited to this task.
102  On the other hand, 
in South Africa the courts have initiated change by way of ad hoc pronouncements in 
consequence of which the legislature has (at times) been prompted or instructed to 
act.
103  (It must  be mentioned that this legislative activity has not always been 
progressive.    One  thinks,  for  example,  of  the  development  occasioned  by  the 
decision  in  J  v  Director  General,  Department  of  Home  Affairs
104  that  was  not 
reflected  in  the  subsequently  enacted  Section  40  of  the  Children's  Act.)
105  The 
difference in approach between South Africa and the Netherlands is however not 
                                                 
102  Maxwell (n 69) S 2.1.1–2.1.2 and 2.2.1. 
103  It can however be agreed with Robson's observation (2007 SAJHR 429) that the order of the 
Constitutional Court in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie actually had the effect of "maintain[ing] 
judicial supremacy".  
104  2003 (5) SA 621 (CC). 
105  In the J-case, S 5 of the Children's Status Act 82 of 1987 was declared unconstitutional to the 
extent that it did not permit the "permanent same-sex life partner" of a woman who had given 
birth to a child in consequence of artificial fertilisation to be regarded as the birth parent of that 
child.   While  the  Children's  Status  Act  was  repealed  by  the  coming  into  operation  of  certain 
sections of the Children's Act on 1 July 2007, S 40 of the latter Act contains the same deficiency 
as S 5 of the repealed Act in that it provides only for the "spouse" of a "married person" to whom 
a child has been born in consequence of artificial fertilisation to be regarded as the child's birth 
parent.  S 40 is consequently prima facie unconstitutional – see Cronjé and Heaton Family Law 
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surprising  given  the  fact  that  the  Dutch  Constitution  does  not  provide  for  judicial 
review of legislation – a fact that explains the less active role played by the courts.
106  
The  position  in  Dutch  law  has  however  not  escaped  criticism,  with  the  ever -
narrowing gap between marriage and registered partnership prompting the question 
as to whether Dutch law provides couples with  "a real choice, rather than simply a 
hollow shell".
107  The same question can also be asked of South African law:  As the 
law stands, couples who do not wish to marry one another but still wish to formalise 
their relationships only have the option of entering into a civil par tnership open to 
them.  However, the legal consequences of (civil) marriage and civil partnership are 
not merely similar as in the Netherlands (regarding civil marriage and registered 
partnership) but are in fact identical.
108  As will be seen below, this ra ises serious 
doubts as to whether the Civil Union Act provides a true alternative to marriage and 
also greatly strengthens the case for the enactment of the (modified)
109 Domestic 
Partnerships  Bill.  Nevertheless,  despite  its  well-structured  framework,  Dutch  law 
lacks comprehensiveness in that it contains no specific legislation regulating non-
formalised  life  partnerships.    In  this regard,  it  is submitted  that  the  enactment  of 
legislation  akin  to  the  unregistered  domestic  partnership  in  the  (modified)  South 
African Domestic Partnerships Bill may be a salutary development. 
 
Dutch law has, since the early nineteenth century, provided for a clear separation 
between state and church as far as the solemnisation and registration of marriages 
is concerned, and in this regard only the state – the so-called Burgerlijke Stand – is 
permitted to solemnise a marriage.
110  On the other hand, South African law permits 
both state and religious officials to qualify as competent marriage officers.  This 
aspect is considered in more detail in Sections 5.3.1.3 and 5.3.3 below. 
 
A clear distinction between Dutch and South African law presents itself when the 
developmental  processes  of  the  family  law  legislation  of  the  two  countries  is 
compared:  In the Netherlands ,  the legislature gradually paved the way for the 
validation of same-sex marriages over a period of five years.  Regarding registered 
                                                 
106  SALRC (n 6) 166–167. 
107  Curry-Sumner "The Netherlands" 274. 
108  S 13 of the Civil Union Act. 
109  See S 2 ante. 
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partnerships, the Commissie voor de toetsing van wetgevingsprojecten published the 
first report concerning the possible recognition of the same a full six years before the 
legislation in question was eventually enacted in 1998.  When compared with the 
position in South Africa, it can be seen that not only was the South African legislature 
only granted a period of twelve months to enact same-sex marriage legislation, but – 
more alarmingly – the document eventually promulgated as the Civil Union Act was 
first tabled a mere three weeks before its enactment.  To make matters worse, this 
document was never made available for public scrutiny or comment.
111 
 
Dutch law makes use of one provision in one piece of legislation in o rder to provide 
for  both  heterosexual   and  homosexual  marriages.    In  addition,  no  inconsistent 
terminology is used, as the word "huwelijk" is universally applied.  In contrast, South 
African  law  not  only  employs  a  separate  piece  of  legislation  to  provide  for  "civil 
unions", but these unions moreover differ markedly from the generic international 
conception thereof, in terms of which "[a]s a duplicate of marriage, civil unions award 
couples  all  the  rights  and  obligations  of  a  marriage  relationship  without  actually 
providing for them to get married".
112  South African law thus provides for a unique 
"civil union" concept:  No other jurisdiction employs a similar dualistic use of this term 
in the sense of using it to create an institution  that potentially qualifies either as a 
"full" marriage or as a civil partnership that enjoys identical legal status to and the 
same legal consequences as a civil marriage. 
 
Having considered these differences, the desirability or otherwise of maintaining the 
status quo in South Africa can now be assessed. 
 
5.2  The case for retaining the Civil Union Act 
 
Bilchitz  and  Judge
113  classify the  "purposes and goals"  behind the validation of 
same-sex marriage into three ma in categories: (a) a  "formal rights" perspective in 
terms of which the rights and benefits of marriage are extended to same-sex couples 
without necessarily equalising the  "social meaning" of marriage; (b) a "substantive 
                                                 
111  See Smith and Robinson (n 66) 1A for a comprehensive discussion of the strange circumstances 
under which the Civil Union Act was drafted and enacted. 
112  SALRC (n 6) 285 (emphasis added). 
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rights"  perspective  that,  by  granting  same-sex  couples  the  full  right  to  marry, 
equalises the "social meaning" but retains marriage as the central form of intimate 
relationship;  and  (c)  the  "transformative"  perspective  that  "seeks  to  de-centre 
marriage  as  the  sole  and  primary  legal  (and  social)  form  for  the  recognition  of 
interpersonal relationships and seeks to create legal possibilities for the recognition 
of a plurality of familial forms".  According to them, the Civil Union Act has the ability 
to achieve all three of these ideals, particularly because by introducing the concept 
of a civil union that allows the parties to such a union to choose between marrying 
one  another  or  concluding  a  civil  partnership,  the  pre-eminence  traditionally 
accorded  to  marriage  can  to  some  extent  be  displaced.
114  The essence of this 
contention therefore is that the South African l egislature's unique use of the term 
"civil union"
115  implies that marriage is not the only means of securing legal and 
societal recognition of an interpersonal relationship.
116  Moreover, by offering the 
parties an alternative to marriage, the authors contend that the Act provides those 
who  wish  to  disassociate  their  relationship  from  marriage  with  the  scope  to 
determine the  "social meaning" that is to attach to their relationship.
117  From this 
postulation,  Bilchitz  and  Judge  proceed  to  contend  that  the  Marriage  Act  is 
superfluous  and  that  it  should  be  repealed.    Further  reasons  for  this  assertion 
include: 
 
(a)  That it is "irrational" to have two Acts that perform the same function; and, 
moreover, "an affront" to same-sex couples to force them to marry in terms 
of separate legislation;
118 
 
(b)  That the effect of the continued existence of the Marriage Act on the "status 
equality" of same-sex couples may either: (i) be non-existent, in which case 
the Act will become redundant; or (ii) have a symbolic effect that prevents 
full equality for same-sex couples and therefore necessitates its repeal; 
 
                                                 
114  Bilchitz and Judge (n 4) 485. 
115  See S 5.1.4 above. 
116  Bilchitz and Judge (n 4) 486. 
117  Bilchitz and Judge (n 4) 484. 
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(c)  That the 1961 Act is a product of the apartheid era and that some of its 
provisions  (such  as  those  prescribing  different  ages  pertaining  to  the 
consent required for male and female minors to marry) are outdated and 
based on gender distinctions that are "constitutionally suspect";
119 and 
 
(d)  That  repealing  the  Act  will  contribute  towards  attaining  both  the 
"substantive rights" and "transformative" ideals identified above. 
 
Bearing the arguments supporting the case for repealing the  Marriage Act in mind, 
the counter-argument for retaining the Act and instead repealing the Civil Union Act 
can now be considered. 
 
5.3  The case for repealing the Civil Union Act 
 
The case for repealing the Civil Union Act is based on the premise that, in as far as 
same-sex marriage is concerned, both the SALRC and the legislature erred in their 
respective approaches to the validation of same-sex marriages.  This point of view is 
substantiated by the following considerations. 
 
5.3.1  The nature of the institution of civil marriage in South Africa 
 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that,  from  a  legal  point  of  view,  the  South  African  civil 
marriage  is  a  secular  institution.
120  As observed by Farlam JA in his minority 
judgment in Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs:
121 
 
I have dealt in some detail with the history of the law of marriage because it 
throws light on a point of cardinal importance in the pres ent case: namely, 
that the law is concerned only with marriage as a secular institution.  It is true 
that  it  is seen  by  many  as  having  a  religious  dimension  also,  but  that  is 
something with which the law is not concerned.
122 
 
                                                 
119  Bilchitz and Judge (n 4) 488–489. 
120  See Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie para 63, in which Sachs J stated that while marriage was 
highly  personal  in  nature,  "the  words  'I  do'  bring  the  most  intense  private  and  voluntary 
commitment into the most public, law-governed and State-regulated domain". 
121  2005 3 SA 429 (SCA) para 80; hereafter Fourie. 
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Despite the fact that the law regards marriage as a purely secular institution, it is 
nevertheless important to remember that South African law provides for both state 
and  church  to  solemnise  civil  marriages.
123  The  Marriage  Act  thus  permits  duly 
authorised ministers of religion or other similarly situated persons to act as marriage 
officers and to solemnise marriages in accordance with the prescripts of their religion 
while simultaneously solemnising that marriage as a civil marriage.
124  Although a 
single ceremony may therefore consist of both a civil and a religious component, it is 
compliance with the civil component ,  as opposed to participating in the religious 
ceremony, that creates legal consequences for the marriage.
125  As opposed to the 
law of the Netherlands, South African law theref ore does not require an absolut e 
separation between state and church regarding the formation of a civil marriage.
126  
Section 31 of the Marriage Act does however permit a religious marriage officer
127 to 
refuse to solemnise a marriage that does not  "conform to  the rites, formularies, 
tenets, doctrines or discipline "  of his or her religion.  (It is to be noted that  the 
Marriage Act does not permit an ex officio marriage officer to refuse to solemnise 
any marriage that complies with civil requirements, or to refuse to do so on the basis 
of his or her religious beliefs.) 
 
Bearing the nature of the South African civil marriage in mind it becomes clear that 
the proposals of both the legislature (in terms of the form and structure of the Civil 
Union Act) and the SALRC are off the mark.  In terms of point (i) of the SALRC's 
recommendations  (see  Section  3.1  above)  there  is  no  problem.    However,  it  is 
submitted that the second point of the proposal is problematic, as it is questionable 
whether it was necessary to promulgate separate legislation in order to realise the 
eventual aim of validating same-sex marriages without prejudicing religious freedom 
in any way.  It is submitted that the reasons in the following sections can be proffered 
in support of the contention that the legislature should have confined its reaction to 
                                                 
123  Bonthuys 2008 SALJ 475. 
124  See S 3 Marriage Act and Singh para 34 and 52.  S 33 of the 1961 Act expressly provides for a 
marriage  that  has  been  solemnised  by  a  marriage  officer  subsequently  to  be  blessed  by  a 
minister of religion or a person holding a responsible position in a religious denomination.   
125  SALRC (n 6) 284; Singh para 34. 
126  See S 4.1 and 5.1 above. 
127  That is to say a minister of religion or a person who holds a responsible position in a religious 
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Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie to point (i) of the SALRC's proposal and should 
thus simply have expanded the Marriage Act. 
 
5.3.1.1  The wording of the Civil Union Act creates uncertainty 
 
In two recent publications,
128 it was pointed out that the  Civil Union Act causes a 
number  of  interpretative  problems,  one  of  the  most  glaring  of  which  is  the  Act's 
references to gender.
129  The problem caused in this regard can be summarised by 
stating that wherever the Act refers to gender it only refers to  same-sex couples,
130 
                                                 
128  See in general Smith and Robinson (n 66) and (n 39).   
129  Also see Van Schalkwyk 2007 De Jure 168 and 172–173, who exposes a further interpretative 
difficulty,  namely  that  it  is  unclear  whether  the  Act  permits  civil  unions  that  are  concluded 
according to customary law (see further in this regard Bakker 2009 JJS 8–9).  It is submitted that 
the  Act  may  contain  another  interpretative  difficulty  over  and  above  those  created  by  its 
references to gender and the uncertainty regarding "customary" civil unions identified by Van 
Schalkwyk.  This difficulty is created by a conflict that appears to exist between S 8(6) of the Act 
and  S  13(2)  thereof.    First,  S  8(6)  states  that  "[a]  civil  union  may  only  be  registered  by 
prospective civil union partners who would, apart from the fact that they are of the same sex, not 
be prohibited by law from concluding a marriage under the  Marriage Act [25 of 1961] or the 
[Recognition of] Customary Marriages Act [120 of 1998]" (emphasis added).  On the other hand, 
S 13(2) informs the reader thereof that: 
With  the  exception  of  the  Marriage  Act  and  the  Customary  Marriages  Act,  any 
reference to- 
(a)  marriage in any other law, including the common law, includes, with such 
changes as may be required by the context, a civil union; and 
(b)  husband, wife or spouse in any other law, including the common law, 
includes a civil union partner. 
  At first glance these two sections may appear to conflict with one another as it could be argued 
that while S 8(6) states that any impediment to marriage that is specifically prescribed in the 
Marriage Act or the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act would prevent the conclusion of a 
civil union, S 13(2) on the other hand tells us that a reference to "marriage", "husband", "wife" or 
"spouse" under the latter legislation does not include a civil union.  To illustrate: it is clear that S 
8(6) intends, for example, to make the provisions relating to marriages between a person and the 
relatives of his or her deceased or divorced spouse (S 28 Marriage Act) applicable to civil unions.  
However, on the wording of S 13(2) this would not be possible.  It is submitted that the answer to 
this predicament lies in the headings to the respective sections in question – S 8(6) falls under 
the heading "[r]equirements for solemnisation and registration of civil union" while S 13 is entitled 
"[l]egal consequences of civil union".  If the use of headings in South African jurisprudence is 
considered,  it  becomes  clear  that  they  may  be  used  as  an  interpretative  tool  in  apposite 
circumstances – see Turffontein Estates Ltd v Mining Commissioner, Johannesburg 1917 AD 
419 431 and President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) para 12.  This 
would  probably  support  the  contention  that,  although  the  Civil  Union  Act  is  not  divided  into 
chapters, it can be deduced from the headings employed throughout the Act that it envisions two 
separate scenarios:  S 4–12 of the Act deal with the solemnisation of the civil union per se while 
S 13 deals with the consequences that follow once the requirements in S 4–12 have in fact been 
complied with.  Under this dichotomy, it could be contended that the headings indicate that S 8(6) 
and 13(2) have nothing to do with one another.  It is worth pointing out that this argument may be 
flawed in that S 13(2) does not specifically indicate that it applies to legal consequences per se 
but instead has a rather generic look to it.  Nevertheless, the conflict between S 8(6) and 13(2) 
once again proves that the drafting of the Act is problematic. 
130  See S 6 and 8(6) of the Act.   BS SMITH AND JA ROBINSON                         PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
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with the result that it is uncertain whether it is possible for a heterosexual couple to 
conclude a civil union.
131  At the time of promulgation of the Act , the Minister of 
Home  Affairs  intimated  that  both  homosexual  and  heterosexual  couples  were 
included within the ambit of the Act,
132 but irrespective of whether or not this occurs 
in practice the fact remains that a literal reading of the Act conveys the message that 
it only applies to homosexual couples.  This unsatisfactory situation may well imply 
that, if constitutionally challenged, the Act would, in accordance with Section 39(2) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
133 need to be interpreted in such a 
manner as to be aligned with the Bill of Rights;
134 a state of affairs that proves that 
the Act was not drafted in such a way as to enable the average South African citizen 
or official to understand what the law expects of him or her.
135  
 
5.3.1.2  The anomalies pertaining to heterosexual life partners 
 
Over and above the interpretative difficulties posed by the Civil Union Act, Smith and 
Robinson
136 highlight the fact that  its enactment has also either created or in other 
instances perpetuated certain legal anomalies.   One of the anomalies identified by 
these authors is that the Act did not address the legal position that prevailed at the 
time of its enactment in terms of which same-sex life partners were entitled to adopt 
children jointly while heterosexual life partners could not do the same.
137  Although 
this anomaly was subsequently removed as from 1 April 2010 by the enactment of 
Section 231 of the  Children's Act, the fact remains that it was not resolved by the 
Civil Union Act itself.  The anomalies that persist are: 
                                                 
131  The answer to this question is particularly relevant as far as the civil partnership is concerned, as 
this partnership is currently the only alternative means by which an unmarried couple may obtain 
full legal recognition of their relationship – see S 3.3.4 above. 
132  Statement made by the then Minister of Home Affairs NN Mapisa-Nqakula (2006) http://home-
affairs.pwv.gov.za/. 
133 1996; hereafter Constitution. 
134  Smith and Robinson (n 66) 367, 368. 
135  See Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd:  
In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 24, in which Langa 
DP observed that the obligation to interpret legislation in line with the Constitution at times needs 
to be weighed up against the legislature's duty to promulgate legislation that is clear and precise.  
136  (n 66) 368–374. 
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(a)  The Civil Union Act provides no indication as to why same-sex couples do 
not – in the wake of a decision such as Du Plessis
138 – need to take the 
proactive step of entering into a civil union in order to have a claim for loss 
of  support  extended  to  the  surviving  life  partner,  while  heterosexual  life 
partners will – in consequence of Volks
139 – have to register a civil union in 
order to do the same;
140 and 
 
(b)  The  Civil  Union  Act  has  not  altered  the  fact  that  the  heterosexual  life 
partnership is still the only form of interpersonal relationship that has no 
right of intestate succession in terms of the Intestate Succession Act.
141 
 
Smith and Robinson may have expected too much from the  Civil Union Act in terms 
of clarifying all of these anomalies – the Act was, after all, promulgated with the chief 
aim  of  legalising  same-sex  marriage.    Nevertheless,  the  fact  remains  that  by 
specifically enacting the civil partnership as an alternative to marriage, the legislature 
did in fact – perhaps unwittingly – enter into the realm of the life partnership.
142  This 
being the case, it might not have been unreasonable to expect at least some of the 
anomalies identified above to have received legislative attention.  The inescapable 
fact is however that when considered in conjunction with the interpretative difficulties 
referred to above it becomes clear that the  Civil Union Act has further complicated 
an already complicated legal framework.  It  will however be seen below that the 
(modified) Domestic Partnerships Bill
143 – and not the Civil Union Act – is best suited 
to remove the anomalies identified by Smith and Robinson. 
 
                                                 
138  In this case, the action of dependants for loss of support was extended to same-sex domestic 
partnerships in which reciprocal duties of support had been undertaken during the subsistence of 
the relationship. 
139  In casu the Constitutional  Court refused to find the  Maintenance of  Surviving Spouses  to be 
unconstitutional to the extent that it did not permit a heterosexual surviving domestic partner to 
claim maintenance from the deceased partner's' estate.  
140  Smith and Robinson (n 66) 372. 
141  Smith and Robinson (n 66) 373–374. 
142  See Sinclair(n 64) 404. 
143  See S 2 ante.  BS SMITH AND JA ROBINSON                         PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
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5.3.1.3  The concept "civil union" is purely semantic and in fact meaningless 
 
Although the Civil Union Act compels same-sex couples to marry one another in 
terms of separate legislation, their union is not termed a "civil union" but is instead 
referred to as a "marriage".
144  This strengthens the assumption referred to earlier
145 
that the reference to  "civil union" is merely of a semantic and cosmetic nature, as 
there  is  no  doubt  that  this  Act  in  f act  allows  parties  to  marry  one  another.  
Furthermore, the legal consequences of a marriage concluded under the Civil Union 
Act are identical to those of a "traditional" civil marriage under the Marriage Act,
146 as 
a result of which it can be concluded that same-sex marriages are accorded a "public 
and private status"
147  that is indistinguishable from that enjoyed by heterosexual 
spouses under the 1961 Act.  The question therefore arises:   why was it necessary 
to promulgate a separate Act if precisely the same  legal content would be ascribed 
to  marriages  concluded  in  terms  thereof  as  those  ascribed  to  the  "traditional" 
heterosexual marriage under the 1961 Act? 
 
In Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie, the Constitutional Court emphasised that in 
selecting an appropriate legislative format for same-sex marriage it was important to 
note that "symbolism and intangible factors play a particularly important role" and 
that "[w]hat might appear to be options of a purely technical character could have 
quite different resonances for life in public and private".
148  It is however questionable 
whether the mere provision of a separate piece of legislation assigns appropriate 
significance to these symbolic considerations and intangible factors.  That there is no 
clear answer to this question becomes apparent when the following considerations 
are borne in mind: 
 
  Although  the  Marriage  Act  of  1961  permits  religious  marriages  to  be 
solemnised by religious marriage officers, the Act remains a "secular" piece 
of  legislation.
149  This is confirmed by the fact that the Act applies in a 
                                                 
144  See S 12(3) of the Act as well as forms B–E in the addenda to the regulations of the Act. 
145  See S 3.2 above. 
146  S 13. 
147  Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie para 81. 
148  Para 139. 
149  Fourie para 78; Van der Vyver and Joubert Persone- en Familiereg 457; Robinson et al South 
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uniform fashion to all civil marriages irrespective of the prescripts of any 
particular religious dogma, and irrespective of whether the parties adhere to 
any form of religion whatsoever.
150 
 
  As seen in the preceding discussion, it is (and has always been) possible 
for a religious marriage officer to refuse to solemnise a marriage that 
conflicts with the tenets or beliefs of his or her religious denomination or 
organisation.
151  In consequence,  it is submitted that ev en if same-sex 
marriages were in principle permitted to be solemnised in terms of the 1961 
Marriage Act, Section 31 of that Act would still provide adequate means by 
which any religious organisation or denomination could protect its beliefs by 
simply permitting its ministers of religion to refuse to solemnise marriages 
between persons of the same sex. 
 
  The Civil Union Act does not alter the fact that South African law does not 
require  a  complete  separation  between  "religious"  and  "purely  civil" 
marriages.    Both  the  Marriage  Act  and  the  Civil  Union  Act  provide  for 
"religious" as well as "purely civil" marriages.  It can therefore rightly be 
asked whether it is worth having a separate Act (that brings about precisely 
the same consequences as the original Act)  or whether such a state of 
affairs does not create unnecessary obfuscation. 
 
In view of these considerations, it is submitted that it would have been far simpler to 
have followed the Dutch example by simply expanding the Marriage Act instead of 
promulgating a new Act that in reality does little (if anything at all) in terms either of 
assigning  appropriate  significance  to  the  symbolic  considerations  and  intangible 
factors  associated  with  marriage  or  of  giving  effect  to  the  SALRC's 
recommendations.  A preliminary conclusion therefore is that the mere expansion of 
the Marriage Act would have been the preferred option.   
 
                                                 
150  Singh para 45; Robinson et al (n 150) 28–29. 
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5.3.2  The  effect  of  repealing  the  Civil  Union  Act  on  Bilchitz  and  Judge's 
"transformative" perspective  
 
It will be recalled that Bilchitz and Judge
152 opine that the validation of same -sex 
marriage should ideally achieve the combined  "purposes and goals"  of both the 
"substantive rights" perspective (according to which granting same-sex couples the 
full right to marry equalises the "social meaning" of marriage but retains marriage as 
the  central  form  of  intimate  relationship)  and  those  of  the  "transformative" 
perspective (in terms of which marriage is de -centred by creating  "a plurality of 
familial forms").
153  With specific reference to the latter  perspective, Bilchitz and 
Judge
154 submit that "the creation of an equal alternative option to marriage  [that is 
the civil partnership] also in some way de -centres marriage as the primary and 
privileged social option for committed interpersonal relationships". 
 
As a point of departure it may be conceded that repealing the  Civil Union Act so as 
to require all marriages henceforth to be performed in terms of the Marriage Act will 
most likely satisfy only the requirements set by the "substantive rights" perspective 
and  will  therefore  do  little  to  erode  the  pre-eminence  enjoyed  by  marriage.  
Nevertheless, an important question to be asked is why Bilchitz and Judge insist that 
the validation of same-sex marriage should be required to achieve anything beyond 
the "substantive rights" perspective in the first place.  In fact, it seems illogical to lay 
the responsibility for de-centring marriage on the law of marriage itself.  After all, it is 
the  extension  of  marriage  that  is  at  issue,  nothing  more  and  nothing  less.    The 
validation  of  same-sex  marriage  should  be  left  at  that  and  therefore  limited  to 
achieving the goals set by the "substantive rights" perspective, thus guaranteeing 
equality of marriage per se.  In the end result, the goals sought to be achieved in 
terms of the "transformative" perspective cannot be achieved by the simple act of 
extending marriage to same-sex couples but must instead be achieved by creating a 
broader family law system of which marriage forms but one part.  This is so because 
                                                 
152  (n 4) 466 f. 
153  Bilchitz and Judge (n 4) 468. 
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marriage can only be de-centred by providing realistic alternatives thereto.  This is 
where the (modified)
155 domestic partnerships legislation comes in.   
 
Viewed in this light, it is submitted that Bilchitz and Judge overestimate the extent to 
which the introduction of  the civil partnership in the  Civil Union Act  achieves the 
objectives of the "transformative" perspective.  In fact, by creating an institution that 
is identical to marriage in all but name, it is submitted that the norm of marriage is 
not de-centred but in fact reinforced.  Indeed, as Goldblatt states:
156 "The [objection 
in this regard] is that marriage and domestic partnership will become identical and 
that this may undermine marriage and the idea of pluralism within family law ".  This 
objection  strengthens  the argument for  the  enactment  of  domestic  partnerships 
legislation that provides a true alternative to marriage. 
 
Having said this, the  "civil partnership" requires closer analysis.  This will be done 
after the further arguments raised by Bilchitz and Judge have been considered in the 
section that follows. 
 
5.3.3  Countering Bilchitz and Judge's additional reasons for asserting that the 
Marriage Act should be repealed 
 
In Section 5.2, Bilchitz and Judge's main reasons for suggesting that the Marriage 
Act should be repealed and that the Civil Union Act should henceforth govern the 
solemnisation of all civil marriages in South Africa were set out.  Over and above the 
"transformative"  arguments  that  have  been  dispensed  with  in  the  preceding 
paragraph,  a  few  brief  comments  are  apposite  regarding  the  additional  reasons 
proffered by these authors: 
 
(a)  The assertion can be accepted that it is irrational to have two pieces of 
legislation  that  have  the  effect  of  forcing  same-sex  couples  to  marry  in 
terms of only one of them.  However, this reason could just as well apply in 
favour of retaining a broadened version of the Marriage Act and repealing 
the Civil Union Act.   
                                                 
155  See S 2 ante. 
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(b)  Regarding the uncertain effect of retaining the 1961 Marriage Act on the 
"status  equality"  of  same-sex  marriages,  it  is  submitted  that  the  entire 
reason for this uncertainty would fall away if all spouses were henceforth to 
be required to marry in terms of the 1961 Act.  This fact alone provides a 
good reason for repealing the  Civil Union Act.  Furthermore, the "status 
equality" of same-sex couples would be enhanced by compelling them to 
marry  in  terms  of  the  very  Act  that  traditionally  only  catered  for 
heterosexual marriages.
157 
 
(c)  Although it is true that certain provisions of the Marriage Act are outdated in 
as far as they prescribe differing age requirements in order for male and 
female minor persons to marry, these and other "outdated" aspects of the 
Act  are  currently  receiving  legislative  attention.    The  Draft  Marriage 
Amendment Bill
158 inter alia aims to streamline the 1961 Act by bringing it 
into  line  with  other  legislation  and  by  effecting  a  number  of  technical 
corrections to the Act.
159  An important outflow of this process is that the 
1961 Act will be aligned with the Children's Act in as far as the reduction of 
the  age of majority  is concerned  and, equally  importantly,  regarding  the 
requirements in order for minor persons to marry.  The amending legislation 
aims to standardise the consent requirements for boys and girls who wish 
to marry by requiring all persons under the age of 15 to obtain the written 
consent of the Minister of Home Affairs in order to marry.
160  This will imply 
that all minors of 15 years or older but under the age of 18 will require 
parental consent (or the equivalent thereof) to marry.  A minor who cannot 
obtain parental consent will be entitled to approach the Children's Court for 
permission  to  marry,  provided  that  such  impossibility  is  not  due  to  a 
parent's refusal to consent.
161  In the event of refusal, the  Draft Marriage 
Amendment Bill retains the legal position in terms of which the High Court 
                                                 
157  These considerations are of particular relevance as far as Bakker's (n 129) hierarchy argument is 
concerned. 
158  GN 149 in GG 31864 of 13 February 2009.  
159  See the long title to the Draft Bill. 
160  Amended S 26.  The ages are currently set at 18 for boys and 15 for girls, with the result that, 
bearing the common law ages of puberty in mind, boys of 14 years or older but under the age of 
18 require the consent of the Minister, while girls of 12 years of age or older but under the age of 
15 require the same. 
161  Amended S 25(1).  BS SMITH AND JA ROBINSON                         PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
 
59/204 
can be approached for permission to marry, which will be granted if the 
court  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  refusal  "is without  adequate  reason  and 
contrary to the interests" of the applicant minor.
162  As an aside, mention 
must be made of a  problematic aspect of the  2009 Draft Bill in that it is 
silent on whether the common law minimum age requirements for marriage 
(presently 14 for boys and 12 for girls) are to be retained.  In this regard the 
2009  Draft  Bill's  predecessor  (the  Draft  Marriage  Amendment  Bill),
163 
proposed that the minimum age for marriage would be set at 12 years for 
both sexes
164  –  a  development  that  would  have  served  to  iron  out  the 
current  gender-based  distinction.   If the  proposals of  the  2009  Draft  Bill 
were to be enacted in their current form, the law of marriage would retain 
the prima facie "unjustifiable" distinction between boys and girls.
165 
 
  In  as  far  as  customary  marriages  are  concerned,  the  Recognition  of 
Customary Marriages Act generally requires all prospective spouses to be 
at least 18 years of age,
166 but permits minor persons to marry in certain 
instances,  provided that the requisite consent is obtained.
167  In many 
instances, these consent requirements are similar to  those prescribed by 
the Marriage Act and, moreover, Act 120 of 1998 contains a number of 
cross-references to the consent provisions contained in the 1961 Act.
168  If 
the latter Act were therefore to be amended in the manner intended by the 
Marriage Amendment Bill, this would imply that these amendments would 
also  pertain  to  customary  marriages  under  the  1998  Act.    On  the  other 
hand,  if  Bilchitz  and  Judge's  recommendation  in  terms  of  repealing  the 
Marriage Act were ever to be followed, this would have a definite impact on 
the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, as the latter Act would need 
to be amended.  Moreover, if it is borne in mind that the Civil Union Act 
prescribes  an  absolute  age  requirement  of  18  before  two  persons  may 
                                                 
162  S 25(4) Marriage Act. 
163  GN 35 in GG 30663 of 14 January 2008, which, incidentally, was the same Gazette in which the 
draft Domestic Partnerships Bill 2008 appeared.  
164  Clause 15 2008 Draft Bill. 
165  See Eskom Holdings Ltd v Hendricks 2005 5 SA 503 (SCA) para 16. 
166  S 3(1). 
167  S 3(3)–(6). 
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marry or enter into a civil  partnership with one another,
169 repealing the 
Marriage Act would imply that the legal position would remain inconsistent 
(and prima facie unconstitutional), as persons under the age of 18 would 
then  be  permitted  to  enter  into  customary  marriages  but  would  not  be 
capable of entering into civil marriages or civil partnerships under the Civil 
Union Act.  It is submitted that repealing the latter Act and simultaneously 
updating the Marriage Act in the manner described above would iron-out 
these inconsistencies. 
 
(d)  Concerning Bilchitz and Judge's argument that the Civil Union Act realises 
the goals and objectives of the "transformative" perspective, it has already 
been  pointed  out  that  the  validation  of  same-sex  marriage  need  only 
succeed  from  the  "substantive  rights"  perspective,  and  that  domestic 
partnerships legislation should instead be tasked with the objective of de-
centring marriage.  
 
(e)  A final aspect to consider is that the Civil Union Act creates a problem as 
far as the position of the marriage officer is concerned.  While the Marriage 
Act permits "religious" marriage officers to refuse to solemnise marriages 
that  are  not  aligned  with  their  religious  beliefs,
170  Section  6 of the  Civil 
Union Act goes a step further by permitting even ex officio marriage officers 
employed by the state to refuse to solemnise marriages between persons 
of the same sex "on the grounds of conscience, religion and belief".
171  This 
provision appears to have been included in the latter Act on the basis of 
Sachs J's observation in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie that the principle 
of reasonable accommodation could possibly permit such officers who had 
                                                 
169  Sinclair (n 64) 408 raises the possibility that the age differentiation encountered in the Marriage 
Act and the Civil Union Act may have been occasioned "on the 'moral' basis that gay and lesbian 
persons under the age of 18 years are too young to be taking a decision to marry.  But this is 
pure  conjecture.    A  mistaken  inconsistency  is  the  more  likely  answer.    Either  way,  the 
differentiation may amount to unfair discrimination, and a constitutional challenge may be lurking 
here".  The opinion of possible unconstitutionality is shared by Van Schalkwyk (n 130) 168. 
170  S 31 of Act 25 of 1961. 
171  Bonthuys (n 122) 474 makes the interesting comment that it is ironic that at the time of voting the 
second Civil Union Bill into law in November 2006 the Members of Parliament of the ruling party 
(the African National Conference) were not permitted a "conscience vote", while the Act allows ex 
officio marriage officials to refuse to solemnise same-sex civil unions on this ground.   BS SMITH AND JA ROBINSON                         PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
 
61/204 
"sincere religious objections" to same-sex marriages to refuse to solemnise 
the same.
172 
 
  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  a  similar  deb ate  regarding  conscientious 
objection has also been raging in the Netherlands, where the Government 
Coalition Agreement has permitted registrars to refuse to solemnise same -
sex unions on such grounds since 2007.
173  Curry-Sumner
174 reports that 
many municipalities nevertheless force registrars to solemnise marriages 
regardless of sex, while others permit registrars "to voice their objections 
and find an alternative registrar". 
 
  Section 6 of the  Civil Union Act has come under fire in recent times, with 
authors  such  as  De Vos  and  Barnard
175  opining that a provision of this 
nature "provides further evidence that [the inequality posed by the Act's co-
existence with the  Marriage Act] is perpetuated and not eradicated".  On 
the  basis  of  similar  reasoning,  Bilchitz  and  Judge
176  hold  that  such  a 
provision cannot be countenanced in that it  "reinforces the message that 
same-sex relationships, as a class, merit different and unequal treatment to 
heterosexual  relationships".  In  a  thorough  analysis  of  the  matter, 
Bonthuys
177  points out that the  "cumulative effect"  of granting  ex  officio 
marriage  officers  the  right  to  object  coupled  with  the  more  rigorous 
appointment procedures prescribed by the Civil Union Act
178 along with the 
effects of "widespread homophobia" could imply that a same-sex couple 
may experience difficulty in finding a civil servant who is willing to marry 
them,  with  the  result that  such a  couple  would  not have  "access  to  the 
basic  social  services  that  are  freely  available  to  opposite-sex  couples".  
Bilchitz  and  Judge  conclude  that  "[p]ublic  officials should  be  required  to 
                                                 
172  Para 159.  Also see Bonthuys (n 122) 474. 
173  Curry-Sumner (n 106) 259. 
174  (n 106) 259. 
175  (n 4) 821.  See Robson (n 102) 430, who opines that this "opt-out" clause is "constitutionally 
suspect." 
176  (n 4) 491–492. 
177  (n 122) 476–477. 
178  In  terms  of  S  5  of  the  Civil  Union  Act,  an  application  must  be  made  both  by  the  religious 
organisation or denomination, as well as by the prospective marriage officer him or herself, while 
S 3 of the 1961 Marriage Act requires only the individual minister of religion to apply.  BS SMITH AND JA ROBINSON                         PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
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uphold the law in an impartial manner and not cast judgment on people 
who approach them to fulfil an official function […] public officials should be 
bound to apply the law of the country without fear, favour or prejudice".  
This  sentiment  is  in  essence  shared  in  the  Dutch  context  by  Curry-
Sumner,
179 who opines: 
 
In the end, the law is, and should always remain, the law.  Since 
marriage as regulated in Art 1:30, Dutch Civil Code, is a civil 
ceremony, a civil servant must abide by the law and execute his 
or her tasks in accordance with the law.  Allowing registrars to 
express conscientious objections undermines the very essence of 
separation of Church and State, and should not be permit ted 
under any circumstances. 
 
  When transposed into the South African context the opinion expressed by 
Curry-Sumner  may  at  first  appear  unnecessarily  rigid.    It  is  however 
important  to  remember  that  Dutch  law  is  far  less  accommodating  of 
religious marriages and marriage offi cers than South African law.
180  It is 
submitted  that  by  providing  for  the  latter ,  South  African  law  already 
complies  with  the  constitutional  imperative  to  protect  religious freedom 
regarding marriage  –  granting  a  right  of  conscientious  objection  to  civil 
marriage officers may be pushing the boundaries too far, and may violate 
the  constitutional  rights  of  the  same-sex  couple  in  question.
181  An 
alternative may be to follow the approach alluded to earlier by Curry -
Sumner
182 in terms of which a civil marriage offic er is permitted to object, 
but is then obliged to arrange for an alternative marriage officer.  Whether 
this would be a realistic and constitutionally tenable alternative is however 
debatable, for the fact would remain that the objection is based solely on  
the sexual orientation of the prospective spouses, a situation  that implies 
that homophobia is effectively condoned by the state, while no other form of 
prejudice is.
183  When all is said and done the inescapable fact remains that 
in solemnising a marriage a civil marriage officer is tasked with performing 
                                                 
179  (n 106) 260. 
180  See S 4.1 above. 
181  Bonthuys (n 122) 478. 
182  (n 106) 259. 
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a  secular  as  opposed  to  a  religious  function.
184  For this reason,  it is 
submitted that the ability to object on religious grounds should therefore, as 
in Section 31 of the Marriage Act, be limited to religious marriage officers.   
 
  It  is  however  important  to  refer  to  one  further  observation  made  by 
Bonthuys that when the conscientious objection clauses in the Marriage Act 
and the Civil Union Act are compared, it becomes clear that the provision in 
the latter Act is more widely phrased than its counterpart in that it allows 
objections  on  the  basis of  "conscience"  and  "belief"  in  addition  to  those 
based on religious beliefs per se.  As a result, she is of the view that "the 
legislation,  as  it  stands,  does  not  consistently,  rationally  and  efficiently 
protect the religious and conscience rights of marriage officers".
185  This in 
turn  leads  Bonthuys
186  to  conclude  that  any  conscientious  objection 
permitted by same-sex marriage legislation on the basis of reasonable 
accommodation should be aligned with the  Marriage  Act  and  therefore 
limited to religious marriage officers who may object on religious grounds 
only.  This argument is not only to be supported, but it also lends further 
credence  to  the  contention  that  the  expansion  of  the  Marriage  Act  to 
encompass same-sex marriage would have been the better option, hence 
necessitating the repeal of the Civil Union Act. 
 
5.3.4  Preliminary conclusion 
 
It is submitted that repealing the Civil Union Act would serve to simplify the complex 
system of laws that currently regulate inter-personal relationships in South African 
family law.  It is however important to note that repealing the Civil Union Act would 
obviously  imply  that  the  civil  partnership  would  no  longer  exist.    With  a  view  to 
ascertaining whether this would be a salutary development, two important questions 
need to be answered: (a) what exactly is a civil partnership; and (b) is the continued 
                                                 
184  Also see Bonthuys (n 122) 476.    
185  Bonthuys (n 122) 481. 
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existence of this form of partnership an absolute necessity in view of the proposed 
(modified)
187 domestic partnership legislation? 
 
6  Is there still a need for the civil partnership? 
 
If  the  arguments  in  Section  5.3.1.3  pertaining  to  the  needlessness  of  separate 
legislation  to  validate  same-sex  marriage  without  infringing  religious  freedom  are 
borne  in  mind  it  becomes  clear  that,  in  real  terms,  the  Civil  Union  Act's  only 
contribution  is  the  introduction  of  the  civil  partnership  institution.  It  is  however 
regrettable that the legislature made no attempt to define this institution, particularly 
in view of its novel nature.  It appears that a civil partnership will be used as a vehicle 
by means of which the legal consequences of a civil marriage can be attached to an 
otherwise  non-formalised  life  partnership  without  the  parties  having  to  marry  one 
another.   Bearing  the  lack  of  legal protection  currently  provided to  unmarried  life 
partnerships  in  mind  (particularly  in  instances  in  which  they  involve  opposite-sex 
couples),
188 this institution could surely be of value, although  – as has been seen 
above – it is debatable whether the civil partnership provides any real alternative to 
marriage.  The situation becomes even more complicated when the provisions of the 
Draft  Domestic  Partnerships  Bill,  2008,  are  borne  in  mind.  As  seen  in  the 
introduction to this paper, this Draft Bill provides for both registered and unregistered 
domestic  partnerships,  and  extends  many  of  the  legal  consequences  of  civil 
marriage  to  such  partnerships.    If  one  considers  that  our  legal  system  currently 
provides for (undefined) civil partnerships and in future may provide for registered 
and/or  unregistered  domestic  partnerships,  it  becomes  clear  –  from  a  purely 
pragmatic  point  of  view  –  that  this multitudinous,  illogical  and  overly  complicated 
legal system would be confusing for legal practitioners, officials and the public.
189  
(This confusing picture would be complicated further by the fact that the term  "life 
partnership" has also become entrenched in post-1994 South African family law.)
190 
 
                                                 
187  See S 2 ante. 
188  See S 3.3.6 ante. 
189  See  Goldblatt  (n  157)  624  and  628,  in  which  she  opines  that  recognition  of  "domestic 
partnerships" should involve minimal formality and that any new legislation should be drafted with 
caution as "many disadvantaged people may not benefit from new laws.  Ignorance of the law, 
illiteracy and lack of access to the courts are barriers to justice that face many". 
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This raises a further important question:  If the 2008 Draft Bill were to be enacted, 
would  there  be  any  room  for  the  civil  partnership  to  co-exist  with  the  registered 
domestic  partnership?    A  point  of  departure  from  which  this  question  may  be 
answered is to assume that both institutions exist with a view to providing a means 
by  which  life  partners  can  formalise  their  unions  without  marrying  one  another.  
Secondly,  it  has  been  seen  that  a  system  that  merely  replicates  marriage  is 
undesirable:  What is required is a realistic alternative to marriage.
191  However, if 
one considers the legal position that would result were the Draft Bill to be enacted in 
its current form, a problematic state of affairs would arise, as, although both forms of 
partnership  share  the  same  point  of  departure,  a  significant  distinction  exists 
between the legal consequences attached to each.
192  This is clearly undesirable, as 
there simply is no logical reason  that the law should on the one hand provide for a 
form of partnership that is a marriage in all but name, and on t he other for a 
registered domestic partnership that, despite being based on the identical notion of 
consortium omnis vitae,
193 differs so markedly from marriage.  While it has already 
been seen that the current state of affairs (in terms of which civil partn ership is the 
only  "alternative"  to  marriage)  is  problematic,  it  appears  that  the  dichotomous 
approach that would be created by recognising both civil and domestic partnerships 
does little more in terms of providing an uncomplicated and realistic alternati ve to 
marriage.  In fact, enacting the  Draft  Bill in its current form would only serve to 
superimpose an inchoate domestic partnership regime onto an already flawed and 
                                                 
191  See SALRC (n 6) 320; Goldblatt (n 157) 621–622; Smith (n 9) 567-588 and 742-746. 
192  An example of such a difference is that a registered domestic partnership is not automatically 
concluded in community of property (see Clause 7(1) of the Draft Bill) while the opposite is true 
of a civil partnership, in which this regime is the default regime.  In addition, certain invariable 
consequences  of  marriage  (or  civil  partnership)  do  not  apply  to  domestic  partnerships.    For 
example, the privilege relating to marital communications (see S 195 Criminal Procedure Act 51 
of 1977) applies to married spouses to a civil, customary or religious marriage – see S 195(2) – 
and as a consequence, also to partners to a civil partnership (by virtue of S 13 of Act 17 of 2006).  
In contrast, the 2008 Draft Bill does not currently provide for the same privilege to be extended to 
domestic  partners.    (This  discrepancy  is  addressed  by  Smith  (n  9)  525-530.)    Furthermore, 
partners involved in a civil partnership will have to divorce one another in terms of the Divorce 
Act 70 of 1979 if they wish to terminate their partnership inter vivos.  This implies that all the 
(patrimonial) consequences of divorce will apply to such a termination.  So, for example, the 
partners would not be able to rely on the court's power to redistribute assets in terms of S 7(3)–
(6) of the Act, owing (inter alia) to the time limits imposed by S 7(3).  In contrast, registered 
domestic partners can terminate their union in a less formal manner and only need approach the 
courts  for  a  termination  order  in  cases  in  which  minor  children  are  involved  (Clause  15).  
Regarding the patrimonial consequences of the termination of the partnership, a redistribution 
order  is  competent  irrespective  of  the  date  on  which  the  partnership  was  entered  into  (see 
Clause 22). 
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overly complicated system.  It is submitted that this is precisely where the (modified) 
domestic partnerships legislation
194 that provides an alternative that co-exists with 
(and in so doing supplements) the institution of marriage in a meaningful, effective 
and realistic manner comes into its own.  On the basis of these considerations , it is 
submitted that  were the (modified) Domestic Partnerships Bill to be enacted there 
would be no need for the "hollow shell"
195 civil partnership institution to be available 
any longer. 
 
7  The course of action suggested 
 
One of the most important differences between the prevailing legal positions in South 
Africa and in the Netherlands is that the latter country's family law system is well 
demarcated and clearly regulated.
196  Parties wishing to solemnise their relationships 
are provided with three options, each of which functions within set parameters and 
exists  independently of  the others.  For example, while Dutch law draws a clear 
distinction  between  marriages  and  registered  partnerships,  the  confusing  and 
overlapping  terminology  such  as  "civil  partnership ",  "civil  union ",  "domestic 
partnership" and "life partnership" proves that the same cannot be said of South 
African family law.  This notwithstanding, Dutch law can possibly be criticised for 
providing  two  choices  that,  in  the  words  of  Curry -Sumner
197  are  "more-or-less 
identical".  In this regard, the Dutch l egislature may do well to consider enacting 
unregistered domestic partnership legislation along the lines of that proposed in 
Chapter 4 of South Africa's Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008. 
 
Second, it is insightful to consider that in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie Sachs J 
cautioned: 
 
The  circumstances  of  the  present matter call  out for enduring  and  stable 
legislative appreciation.  A temporary remedial measure would be far less 
likely to achieve the enjoyment of equality as promised by the Constitution 
than would lasting legislative action compliant with the Constitution.
198 
                                                 
194  See S 2 ante. 
195  To borrow Curry-Sumner's (n 106 274) description of contemporary Dutch law. 
196  See Smith and Robinson (n 66) 376–379.  
197  (n 106) 274. 
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The legal position sketched above shows that the Civil Union Act was unfortunately 
not the product of "enduring and stable legislative intervention".  In addition, the fact 
that  the  Minister  of  Home  Affairs  expressly  stated  that  the  Act  was  merely  a 
temporary measure
199 serves to underscore the contention that the legislature paid 
scant attention to Sachs J's cautionary remarks.  
 
It is submitted that the Civil Union Act is an unnecessary piece of legislation and that 
the  mere  amendment  of  the  Marriage  Act  (in  accordance  with  point  (i)  of  the 
SALRC's  recommendations)
200  would have been a more effective option.  This 
opinion is bolstered by  the possibility of the enactment of domestic partnerships 
legislation:  It stands to reason that such legislation should be aligned with and 
should supplement existing legislation such as the  Marriage Act and the Civil Union 
Act.    The  problem  is  however  that  the  dichotomy  that  would  be  created  by  the 
enactment of the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill in its current form along with the 
continued existence of the civil partnership would not only fail to achieve such an 
alignment, but would also create an overly complicated legal position that provides 
no effective, realistic or clearly understandable alternative to marriage.  On the other 
hand,  the  enactment  of  the  (modified)  domestic  partnership  legislation
201  would 
facilitate a better alignment with marriage and would prove that the civil partnership 
(as an effective carbon copy of as opposed to realistic alternative to marriage) is 
superfluous  and  unnecessary.    In  addition,  enacting  the  legislation  while 
simultaneously repealing the Civil Union Act would imply that the interpretative and 
legal anomalies that Smith and Robinson,
202 for example, describe as either being 
created or perpetuated by the Civil Union Act would fall away.  Such a development 
would also go a long way towards providing the means by which not only the pre-
eminence enjoyed by marriage could to some extent be displaced, but also by which 
better  legal  protection  could  be  provided  for  the  vulnerable  members  to  whom 
Bonthuys
203  refers  when  she  states  that  the  enactment  of  same -sex  marriage 
legislation that is effectively based on the civil marriage  "not only reinforces the 
centrality of existing marriage rules and requirements, holding them up as the ideal 
                                                 
199  South African Broadcasting Corporation http://www.sabcnews.com/. 
200  See S 3.1 above. 
201  See S 2 ante. 
202  (n 66) and 2008 BYUJPL. 
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which all should aspire to, but it also fails to address the inadequacy of marriage law 
to protect the interests of vulnerable family members, often women and children". 
 
In the final analysis, it must be concluded that the legislature should dispense with 
the Civil Union Act by:  (a) incorporating same-sex marriage into the Marriage Act;
204 
and (b) simultaneously doing away with the civil partnership by replacing  the Civil 
Union Act with the (modified) Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008. 
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